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INSURANCE LAW
MAUREEN SANDERS*

Insurance issues have been injected into many, if not most, areas of
the law during modem times. This phenomenon has not been ignored in
New Mexico. The judiciary and the legislature were both fairly active in
the insurance arena during the survey period of April 1, 1987, to January
31, 1988.'
During this time, the New Mexico and federal judiciary issued fifteen
decisions which addressed major aspects of insurance law. Some of the
opinions included discussions of issues not previously decided in New
Mexico. Others reiterated long standing principles of law. Still others are
noteworthy as alterations to previous case law or as indicators of changes
in how the courts will interpret the law in the future. The New Mexico
Supreme Court was responsible for twelve 2 of the fifteen appellate decisions discussed in this article while the court of appeals issued two of
the opinions 3 and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one. 4
The New Mexico legislature was also attentive to many aspects of New
Mexico insurance law. It was very active in the area of workers' compensation law. A full discussion of that activity is beyond the scope of
this article. 5 Additionally, the legislature enacted laws affecting agents,
insurance companies, health insurance consumers, the elderly, and car
rental companies. A brief overview of this legislation is included at the
end of this article.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
I. For a discussion of insurance law cases immediately preceding the survey period of this article,
see Popejoy & Ray, Commercial Law, 17 N.M.L. REV. 219 (1987).
2. Anchor Equities v. Pacific Coast Am., 105 N.M. 751, 737 P.2d 532 (1987); Baker v. Armstrong,
106 N.M. 395, 744 P.2d 170 (1987); Branchal v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 106 N.M. 70, 738 P.2d
1315 (1987); CC Housing Corp. v. Ryder Truck Rental, 106 N.M. 577, 746 P.2d 1109 (1987);
Continental Ins. Co. v. Fahey, 106 N.M. 603, 747 P.2d 249 (1987); Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark
v. Bustani, 105 N.M. 760, 737 P.2d 541 (1987); Green v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 106
N.M. 523, 746 P.2d 152 (1987); Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Wylie Corp., 105 N.M. 406, 733
P.2d 854 (1987); Lee v. General Accident Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 22, 738 P.2d 516 (1987); Parsons v.
Keil, 106 N.M. 91, 739 P.2d 505 (1987); Roscoe v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas, 105 N.M.
589, 734 P.2d 1272 (1987); Western Commerce Bank v. Reliance Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 346, 732
P.2d 873 (1987).
3. Russell v. Protective Ins. Co., 26 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 401 (Ct. App. April 23, 1987), rev'd.,
107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693 (1988); State v. Gurley Motor Co., 105 N.M. 803, 737 P.2d 1180 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 781, 737 P.2d 893 (1987).
4. Suggs v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 833 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1987).
5. See McGee, Workers' Compensation Law, 18 N.M.L. REV. 579 (1988) and Workers' Compensation 'Law, survey article to be published in 20 N.M.L. REV. in 1990.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The New Mexico and federal appellate cases decided during the survey
period addressed issues relating to many aspects of insurance law. They
included decisions involving litigation issues, coverage disputes, multicoverage issues and insurers' duties to their insureds.
A. Litigation Issues
The litigation issues which the appellate courts addressed during the
survey period included who may sue an insurance company, 6 on what
causes of action7 and under what time constraints. 8 Additionally, the
supreme court addressed the effect of an insurance company's filing an
interpleader action. 9
Generally, the courts of New Mexico have not allowed a third party
claimant to bring a direct action against an insurance company but rather
have required that the suit be brought against the insured wrongdoer."°
In Anchor Equities, Ltd. v. Pacific Coast American, however, the New
Mexico Supreme Court allowed Anchor to sue United States Fire Insurance Company (USFI) as the issuer of a fidelity bond to Title Escrow,
Inc., without first bringing suit against Title Escrow. " Anchor had transferred $80,254 into Title Escrow's trust account.' 2 Anchor alleged that
the owner and sole employee of Title Escrow misappropriated and absconded with the funds which it had deposited into Title Escrow's trust
account.' 3 USFI asserted that the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.' 4 The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss. S
Justice Walters, with Justices Ransom, Scarborough and Sosa concurring, reversed the trial court's decision and remanded for reinstatement
of the complaint. In doing so the court seemed to expand its previous
decision in England v. New Mexico State Highway Commission.'6 In
England, the court articulated a three-part test for determining whether
6. Anchor Equities v. Pacific Coast Am., 105 N.M. 751, 737 P.2d 532 (1987).
7. Russell v. Protective Ins. Co., 26 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 401 (Ct. App. April 23, 1987), rev'd.,
107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693 (1988); State v. Gurley Motor Co., 105 N.M. 803, 737 P.2d 1180 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 781, 737 P.2d 893 (1987).
8. Green v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 106 N.M. 523, 746 P.2d 152 (1987).
9. Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark v. Bustani, 105 N.M. 760, 737 P.2d 541 (1987).
10. See, e.g.. Caster v. Board of Educ. of Albuquerque, 86 N.M. 779, 527 P.2d 1217 (Ct. App.
1974).
11. 105 N.M. 751, 752, 737 P.2d 532, 533 (1987).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 91 N.M. 406, 575 P.2d 96 (1978).
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a direct cause of action would be permitted against an insurer."' Under
England, a direct cause of action is permitted if: (1)the insurance is
procured by force of legislative enactment; (2) the benefit from the purchase of the insurance coverage inures to the benefit of the public; and
(3) the statute does not prohibit an action against the insurer. 8 The Anchor
court concluded that the Escrow Company Act's 9 mandate that all escrow
companies be ."covered by an employee dishonesty bond insuring the
escrow company against loss of money or negotiable securities ' 2 fulfilled
the first requirement. The court went on to find England's second requirement fulfilled by the general intent of the Escrow Company Act to
protect the citizens of the state, although the court did not specifically
address the England requirement that the benefit from the purchase of
the insurance coverage must inure to the benefit of the public. 2' The court
further concluded that there was no statutory language allowing or prohibiting a direct action against the insurer and consequently held that the
action could be maintained..The dissent by Justice Stowers focused on the importance of distinguishing between the nature of fidelity bonds and liability insurance. 23
He argued that the fidelity bond issued by USFI was to indemnify Title
Escrow against proven losses of money or property through acts of employee dishonesty and, therefore, the benefits of the bonds did not inure
to the benefit of the public. 24 He concluded that the Escrow Company
Act required an escrow company to get a fidelity bond 25 and not liability
insurance. He stated:
However, if an escrow company purchases a fidelity bond, as required
by New Mexico statutory law, and an employee commits an act of
dishonesty against the company, the escrow company can make a
claim under its bond, thereby protecting the security of all other
items given to it by members of the public to hold in safekeeping.
To allow a direct action on that bond would be to risk losing all of
the bond money to the first claimant, thereby potentially putting the
escrow company out26 of business and threatening the loss of all other
property held by it.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
ANN.
26.

Id.
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§58-22-1 to -33 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §58-22-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
91 N.M. at 408, 575 P.2d at 98.
105 N.M. at 753, 737 P.2d at 534.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 754, 737 P.2d at 535. The Act requires an "employee dishonesty bond." N.M.
§ 58-22-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
105 N.M. at 755, 737 P.2d at 536.

STAT.
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Justice Stowers would have affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the availability of causes
of action based on the Unfair Practices Act (UPA) and on the Unfair
Insurance Practices Act (UIPA) in State v. Gurley Motor Co. 27 The State
brought suit against Gurley Motor Company, 28 alleging that it had violated
the New Mexico UPA. 29 The alleged unfair practices centered on the
payment of illegal insurance premium rebates from Lloyd's of the Southwest to Gurley Motor Company as well as other deceptive practices.:
The State contended that Gurley Motors solicited insurance sales and
referred customers to Lloyd's for motor vehicle insurance even though
Gurley was not a licensed insurance agent, broker or solicitor at the time
it received rebates. 3 The State also asserted that Gurley made misrepresentations to customers regarding common ownership of Lloyd's and
Gurley and the insurance premium and commission payments.32 The State
sought injunctive relief, civil penalties, and the payment of restitution to
consumers.33 The trial court granted Gurley's motion to dismiss finding
that the alleged conduct was governed exclusively by the UIPA34 and was
exempted from the UPA. 35

In an opinion authored by Judge Donnelly with Judges Alarid and
Apodaca concurring, the court of appeals analyzed the actions prohibited
and the remedies available pursuant to the two Acts. The court found that
the Acts did not contain conflicting statutory prohibitions36 and that different types of remedies were available for violations of the two Acts.37
The court concluded that the legislature did not intend to make the UIPA
3
the exclusive state law remedy for conduct prohibited in the UIPA. 1
The court then proceeded to defendant's argument that its conduct was
exempted from the sanctions and relief provided in the UPA.3 9 The UPA
does not apply to "actions or transactions permitted under laws admin27. 105 N.M. 803, 737 P.2d 1180 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 781, 737 P.2d 893 (1987).
28. Originally Lloyd's of the Southwest Insurance Company and eight individuals were also
named as defendants. The State abandoned its appeal as to all defendants except Gurley Motor
Company. Id.
29. Id.; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§57-12-1 to -16 (1978).
30. 105 N.M. at 804, 737 P.2d at 1181.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§59-11-9 to -22 (1978). The UIPA was repealed and replaced with
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55A-16-1 to -30 (Orig. 1984) effective January 1,1985.
35. 105 N.M. at 805, 737 P.2d at 1182.
36. Id. at 806, 737 P.2d at 1183.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 807, 737 P.2d at 1184.
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istered by a regulatory body of the state of New Mexico or the United
States." 4' The court concluded that the exemption applied to activities
permitted under other laws, not to activities that were not even implicitly
authorized under other regulatory licensing laws. 4 The actions which the
State alleged Gurley took were not permitted under the insurance law
and Gurley was not licensed or supervised by the Department of Insurance. The court concluded that the exemption from the UPA did not
apply.4 2 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's order dismissing
the State's complaint and remanded the cause for a trial on the merits.43
In April 1987, the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the issue
of whether a plaintiff can sue a workers' compensation carrier for refusing
to attempt "in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable""
settlement of his compensation claim.45 The trial court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss the count in which plaintiff alleged the refusal to attempt
to settle.46 Defendant based the motion on the exclusivity provisions of
the Workers' Compensation Act.4 7 The court of appeals, relying on Dickson v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. 4" and Gonzales v. United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. ,4 reversed the trial court and concluded
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
105 N.M. at 807, 737 P.2d at 1184.
Id. at 808, 737 P.2d at 1185.
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-16-20 (Orig. Pamp. 1984) provides:
Any and all of the following practices with respect to claims, by an insurer or
other person, knowingly committed or performed with such frequency as to
indicate a general business practice, are defined as unfair and deceptive practices
and are prohibited:

E. not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements
of an insured's claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;
45. Russell v. Protective Ins. Co., 26 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 401 (Ct. App. April 23, 1987), rev'd,
107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693 (1988). The author realizes that the supreme court decision is outside
the survey period but feels compelled to include it in this discussion for obvious reasons.
46. 107 N.M. at 10, 751 P.2d at 694.
47. Id. The Workers' Compensation Act in effect at the time this action arose provided:
The right to the compensation provided for in this act [Chapter 52, Article I
NMSA 19781, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever, to any and all persons
whomsoever, for any personal injury accidentally sustained or death resulting
therefrom, shall obtain in all cases where the following conditions occur:
A. at the time of the accident, the employer has complied with the provisions
thereof regarding Insurance;
B. at the time of the accident, the employee is performing service arising out
of and in the course of his employment; and
C. the injury or death is proximately caused by accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment and is not intentionally self-inflicted.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-8 (Repl. Pamp.
1987).
48. 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d I (1982).
49. 99 N.M. 432, 659 P.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1983).
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that the workers' compensation exclusivity provision barred a suit based
on the insurer's refusal to settle a claim."
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in an
opinion written by Justice Sosa with Justices Scarborough, Walters and
Ransom concurring. The supreme court held that the Insurance Code, as
enacted in 1984 after the Dickson and Gonzales decisions, allowed a
cause of action against workers' compensation carriers for bad faith refusal
to pay compensation benefits to workers. 5 The supreme court reached
this decision by reasoning in a rather convoluted manner that the legislature intended to broaden the Workers' Compensation Act when it provided for a private right of action for violation of Article 16 of the
Insurance Code which sets forth prohibited trade practices relating to
insurance. 2 The court did limit the applicability of a private right of
action to those situations where there is an "intentional, willful refusal
to pay compensation benefits, and not to an insurer's negligent or dilatory
failure to pay benefits. "5 3 Furthermore, the court found that the damages
asserted under the new cause of action must have been unrelated to the
54
worker's physical or psychological job related disability. The court
55
reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment.
Consequently, a worker seeking workers' compensation benefits may bring
an action against the compensation carrier when the carrier intentionally
and willfully refuses to pay compensation benefits, if the damages claimed
are unrelated to the worker's physical or psychological job related disability.
The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the time during which one
may bring an action to recover insurance benefits in Green v. General
Accident Insurance Company of America.56 Justice Ransom wrote the
opinion with Justices Sosa and Walters concurring. Mr. Green filed suit
26 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 402.
107 N.M. at 11, 751 P.2d at 695; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§59A-16-20 and 59A-16-30 (Orig.
1984).
107 N.M. at 12, 751 P.2d at 696; N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-16-30 provides:
Any person covered by this article (Article 16) who has suffered damages as
a result of a violation of Article 16 of the Insurance Code by an insurer or agent
is granted a right to bring an action in district court to recover actual damages.
Costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party if:
A. the party complaining of the violation of Article 16 has brought an action
which he knew to be groundless; or
B. the party charged with the violation of Article 16 has willfully engaged in
the violation.
The relief provided in this section is in addition to remedies otherwise available against the same
conduct under the common law or other statutes of this state.
53. 107 N.M. at 12, 751 P.2d at,695.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 106 N.M. 523, 746 P.2d 152 (1987).

50.
51.
Pamp.
52.
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to recover benefits under his homeowner's policy for theft of property
from his home.57 The home was burglarized on January 25, 1982, and
again on September 17, 1982.58 Mr. Green filed the suit in April 1984. "
The insurance policy required prompt notification of loss and a sworn
proof of loss within 60 days of the loss." Furthermore, the policy barred
suits unless the notification and proof of loss requirements were met and
suit was brought within twelve months after any loss. 6' Finally, the policy
made invalid any waiver of provisions if the waiver was not in writing. 62
Immediately after the January incident Green notified the insurance
agent by personally telling him of the incident and by sending a letter on
March 15, 1982, with a list and appraisal of taken items.63 In May, Green
gave a statement to an adjuster and in October he submitted a notarized
document labelled "swom statement in proof of loss" which he had been
given in September.64 He was told that it was unacceptable but would be
retained.65 Green was never told during the initial months of investigation
that his proof of loss needed verification.66 In April or May of 1982,
Green signed a non-waiver agreement in which he agreed that the insurer's
actions would not waive any rights of Green or General Accident under
the insurance contract.67 Within 90 days of the September incident General
Accident offered Green a settlement of that claim.6 8 Green never counter
offered. 69 Green brought suit in April of 1984.70
The trial court granted judgment to Green for both losses to the extent
of the maximum liability provided under the policy. 7 On appeal, the
supreme court addressed the losses separately. The trial court determined
that General Accident, by its own acts, induced Green to reasonably
believe that the September 17 loss was going to be settled to his satisfaction without suit.7 2 With respect to the September 17 loss, the supreme
court determined that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial
court's finding that General Accident was stopped from relying on the
57. id. at 524, 746 P.2d at 153.
58. Id.
59. Id.at 526, 746 P.2d at 155.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 525, 746 P.2d at 154.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 526, 746 P.2d at 155.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Mr. Green did not recover 100% of the loss from the second burglary because of a $500 limit
of liability for non-scheduled jewelry. Id.
72. Id.
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twelve month time-to-sue provision.73 The trial court decision allowing
recovery to Green for the September 17 loss, therefore, was reversed
because of Green's failure to timely sue.74

The court reached a different conclusion on the earlier January 25 loss
after discussing the policy provisions relating to notice, proof of loss and
written waiver considerations.7 5 In New Mexico, substantial compliance
with the terms of an insurance policy as to notice of loss and proof of
loss is all that is required to allow recovery on the policy.76 A review of
the various contacts and writings between the company and Green led
the supreme court to agree with the conclusion apparently reached by the
trial court that the insurer had waived any right to demand exact com-77
pliance with the policy requirements regarding notice and proof of loss.
The more important issue the supreme court addressed related to the
time-to-sue provision. Green had not filed his suit within the twelve month
period required under the insurance contract. 78 The court recognized that
time-to-sue provisions had been upheld in the past and that the company
can raise a violation of the provision as an affirmative defense without
having to show any prejudice resulting from the violation. 79 However, a
company can waive a time-to-sue provision. "The acts and conduct generally held to constitute a waiver of a time-to-sue provision are those acts
which would lull the insured into reasonably believing that its claim would
be settled without suit.""8 After reviewing the facts the court determined
that waiver may have occurred even though Green had signed a nonwaiver agreement which stated that actions by General Accident to investigate, settle, defend or deny claims would not waive any of the
company's rights under the insurance contract. 8' The court remanded to
the district court for further findings of fact and conclusions regarding
waiver of the time-to-sue provision with respect to the January 25 loss. 82
In May 1987, the supreme court considered whether filing an interpleader action was an admission of liability, in Fireman's Insurance
Company of Newark, New Jersey v. Bustani.83 In that case, Fireman's
had filed an interpleader action in state district court on January 9, 1985,
and deposited $100,000 in the court registry. 84 Fireman's insured had been
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 527, 746 P.2d at 156.
Id.
Id.
Robinson v. Palatine Ins. Co., II N.M. 162, 66 P. 535 (1901).
106 N.M. at 527, 746 P.2d at 155.
Id.
Id.
Peoples State Bank v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 751, 752, 635 P.2d 306, 307 (1981).
106 N.M. at 527, 746 P.2d at 156.
Id.
105 N.M. 760, 737 P.2d 541 (1987).
Id.
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involved in an auto accident in which two people were killed.8 The policy

issued by Fireman's had limits of liability of $100,000.86 The mother of

one of the individuals who died in the accident filed suit against Fireman's
insured in federal court in 1982.87 The federal court jury, finding no
liability, returned a verdict in favor of Fireman's insured in June 1985.88
The state district court then granted Fireman's motion to dismiss the
interpleader because only one individual now had a viable claim for the
proceeds from the Fireman's insurance policy.89
The supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Walters with Justices
Scarborough and Ransom concurring, considered whether the filing of
an interpleader action constituted an irrevocable admission of liability to
the extent of the funds deposited.' The court affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the interpleader action. 9' In doing so, the court recognized
that the general rule in interpleader actions was that the deposit of money
into the court constituted an admission that the stakeholder was liable to
someone. 2 The court noted, however, that Rule 1-022 of the New Mexico
Rules of Civil Procedure included a more liberal approach to interpleader.
That rule specifically provides that it is no longer a ground for objection
that "the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to any or
all of the claimants." 93 The court went on to recognize that affirming the
trial court would effect no harm to Fireman's or the estate of the remaining
claimant because the estate would have to prove its case against Fireman's
insured in its pending suit just as it would have been required to do in
the interpleader action. 94

B. Coverage Disputes
American courts commonly must decide whether a particular insurance
policy covers a particular incident. During the survey year the New
Mexico Supreme Court addressed coverage issues in four cases. 95 In doing
so it clarified rules of construction, the meaning of the word "use" in
insurance policies, certain exclusions, the omnibus clause96 as well as the
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.at 761, 737 P.2d at542.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. SCRA 1986, 1-022.
94. 105 N.M. at 761, 737 P.2d at 542.
95. Baker v. Armstrong, 106 N.M. 395, 744 P.2d 170 (1987); Insurance Co. of North Am. v.
Wylie Corp., 105 N.M. 406, 733 P.2d 854 (1987); Lee v. General Accident Ins. Co., 106 N.M.
22, 738 P.2d 516 (1987); Parsons v. Keil, 106 N.M. 91, 739 P.2d 505 (1987).
96. Omnibus clauses are found in automobile liability policies. They usually provide liability
coverage for drivers, other than the named insureds, who are using the vehicle with the permission
of the insured.
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relationship between punitive damages and insurance policies. Additionally, the tenth circuit addressed a coverage issue involving the requirement
97
that the insured have an insurable interest in the property insured.
In Insurance Company of North America v. Wylie Corporation" the
supreme court construed certain provisions in policies issued by two
companies. Insurance Company of North America (INA) insured Ben
Jones and his truck." Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company insured
Wylie Corporation under both comprehensive general liability coverage
and comprehensive automobile liability coverage." INA and Jones sued
Wylie for damages to Jones' truck.'' Wylie filed a third-party complaint
02
against its own insurer, Mountain States. The trial court found in favor
of INA against Wylie and also entered judgment against Mountain States
for indemnification of Wylie for the judgment as well as costs and attorney
fees. 103
When the damage to Jones' truck occurred, Jones was working as an
independent contractor for Wylie.t" Wylie's caterpillar was pushing Jones'
truck while spreading its contents. 0 5 As was customary, Jones' truck was
in neutral and Jones had no control over the distance or speed his truck
was pushed. "0The caterpillar which was operated by Wylie's employee
pushed Jones' truck into another truck and thereby caused damage to
Jones' truck. 0' 7
The Mountain States policies issued to Wylie excluded damage to
8
property used or under the control of Wylie." The INA policy had an
omnibus clause that included as an insured anyone using Jones' truck
with Jones' permission. "0The supreme court sifted through an inconsistency in the trial court's findings and determined that Wylie's relationship
with Jones' truck at the time of the occurrence fell within the meaning
0
of "use" in the context of vehicle insurance law." The supreme court
further concluded that Wylie was using the vehicle with the permission
97. Suggs v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 833 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1987).
98. 105 N.M. 406, 733 P.2d 854 (1987).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 407, 733 P.2d at 855.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 408, 733 P.2d at 856. The court read the term "use" in a broad fashion and included
in its meaning any exercise of control over the vehicle regardless of the purpose, extent, or duration
of the control.
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of Jones.' Consequently, the court determined, in an opinion by Justice
Walters with Justices Scarborough and Sosa concurring, that Wylie's use
of the truck was within the exclusions of the Mountain States policies
and within the omnibus clause of the INA policy." 2 The court therefore
held that Mountain States was not liable to Wylie for indemnification.''"
The court also determined that Wylie was not liable to INA in subrogation
for damage to Jones' truck because Wylie was an insured under the JonesINA policy's omnibus clause." 4
In Parsons v. Keil'" the supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Sosa
with Justices Walters and Ransom concurring, interpreted an insurance
contract issued by American Home Assurance Company to Ray Keil,
d/b/a Aztec Motor Speedway. Parsons had been injured while acting as
a flagman during an automobile race." 6 Parsons maintained that he was
covered by the policy issued to Keil while American Home maintained
that three exclusions contained in the policy prevented such coverage.'"
Exclusion (i) applied to anyone covered by "any workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation or disability benefits law, or under
any similar law. "" 8 Exclusion (j) applied to any "employee of the insured
arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured."' 9
Exclusion (p) applied to "any spectator or member of the general public
authorized to enter a restricted area including any infield area not protected
with guardrail and fencing."' 20 The trial court found that Parsons was
not an employee of the Speedway on the night in question although he
was employed by Keil for a different business.' 2 ' The appellate court
concluded that there was sufficient favorable evidence to sustain that
finding. 2 2 Consequently, the court concluded that neither exclusion (i)
23
nor exclusion (j) applied.'
Parsons was asked to go into the pit area and wave a yellow flag for
111.
Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. The court reached this decision even though INA claimed that damage to the truck was
excluded from coverage under a clause that excluded "property damage to property owned or
transported by the insured or in the insured's care, custody, or control." The court logically concluded
that this exclusion referred only to property other than the covered vehicle itself. Id.
115. 106 N.M. 91, 739 P.2d 505 (1987).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 92, 739 P.2d at 506.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The trial court had determined that Keil had attempted unsuccessfully to collect workers'
compensation as an injured employee of Keil's other business. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

25
the drivers. 124 The pit area was an area described in exclusion (p).1 If

Parsons was authorized to enter the area, then exclusion (p) would destroy
126
coverage of Parsons under the American Home policy. The supreme
court agreed with Parsons' argument and the trial court's decision that in
this case, Parson was not authorized to enter the pit area but was merely
permitted to enter the area.1 7 The deciding fact seemed to be that the
insurer had provided Keil with waiver forms for persons to sign prior to
entering the pit area. Parsons had not signed a waiver before entering the
form
pit area that night. 128 Keil's failure to have Parsons sign a waiver
29
constituted a failure to authorize Parsons' entry into the pit area.' American Home was, therefore, required to pay damages to Parsons up to the
limits of the policy.' 3
An omnibus clause of an automobile policy was the center of the
3
controversy in Lee v. GeneralAccident Insurance Co. ' Lee's personal
representative had sued in a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether General had a duty to defend the driver of a vehicle involved in
an accident and whether the driver was covered under the General automobile policy. 132 The relevant accident occurred on May 1, 1982, between a vehicle driven by Charles Brown, who was intoxicated, and a
34
vehicle driven by Richard L. Lee.' 33 Lee died as a result of the accident.'
The title to the car Brown was driving was held in the name of Vonda
Mead and Allen and Nadine Mead.' 35 General Accident Insurance Company had issued a liability insurance policy to the Meads which covered
the automobile involved in the accident.' 36
The court determined that the insurer did not have a duty to defend
the driver of the vehicle it insured. " The policy excluded from coverage.
any person using a vehicle without reasonable belief that he was entitled
' In Lee, the evidence in support of non-coverage was plentiful.
to use it. 38
One of the owners of the vehicle told the driver he was not supposed to
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 94, 739 P.2d at 508.
Id.
106 N.M. 22, 738 P.2d 516 (1987).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Fall 1989]

INSURANCE LAW

drive her car.'39 The driver hit her in the jaw and took the keys." 3 She
did not retrieve her keys from him because she was afraid of him.' 4
Plaintiff, who was the personal representative of Lee, urged the court
to overlook the substantial evidence showing the driver had no reasonable
belief he had permission to drive in favor of a public policy of protecting
the innocent public. 41 2 The court recognized that the legislature, to foster
such a policy, mandated that insurance companies offer uninsured motorist
coverage. "' That coverage had been rejected .by Lee.'" The court, in an
opinion by Justice Walters with Justices Sosa and Stowers concurring,
stated that it could not "ignore the coverage conditions of the owner's
insurer to provide protection that Lee himself could have obtained."' 4 5
The supreme court affirmed the judgment in favor of General Accident
Insurance Company.' 46
The major coverage issue which the supreme court addressed during
the survey period was the insurability of punitive damages. In Baker v.
Armstrong, the defendant Armstrong had brought a third-party action
against its insurer."' In the third-party action, Armstrong sought a declaratory judgment that the insurance policy covered the Bakers' punitive
damages claim.' 4 8 The trial court granted Armstrong's insurer, General
Accident Insurance Company, summary judgment in its favor. ""' On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Ransom
with Justices Sosa and Scarborough concurring, first considered whether
the policy issued to Armstrong included coverage of punitive damages. 0
Second, the court considered whether insurance coverage of punitive
damages would be against public policy and therefore unenforceable."'
The automobile policy issued by General Accident provided that the
insurer would pay "damages for bodily injury or property damage for
which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an auto
accident." 52 The court noted that the policy had no exclusion for damages
awarded to punish for driving in a grossly negligent, reckless, wanton
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 23, 738 P.2d at 517.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
106 N.M. 395, 396, 744 P.2d 170, 171 (1987).
Id. at 396, 744 P.2d at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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or willful manner. 5'The insurance company argued that punitive damages
were for punishment and not for bodily injury or property damage and,
therefore, not included within the coverage.' 54 The court, relying on the
applicable uniform jury instructions, 55 concluded that punitive damages
could not be awarded unless bodily or property damage occurred and that
the punishment must be reasonably related to the injury or damage." 6
The court further noted that the reasonable expectations of the average
insured with an automobile policy containing the language this policy
contained would include coverage for claims of any character for which
he might become liable in the operation of an automobile.' 5 7 The court
stated that "[a] court should not construe an exclusion of liability for
punitive damages where there is nothing in the insuring clause to forewarn
an insured that such was to be the intent of the parties."' 58 Based on this
reasoning, the court concluded that the language of the policy included
punitive damages within its coverage."'
Because the court determined that the language of the policy included
punitive damages, " it next addressed whether a contract covering punitive damages was enforceable in New Mexico. 6 ' The court first reviewed the relevant existing legislation. The court found no statute that
prohibited insurance coverage of punitive damages.' 62 On the contrary,
it found that the New Mexico Insurance Code "allows for insurance
against any loss, liability or expense resulting from the use of a vehicle." 163 The court also noted that the Tort Claims Act requires a governmental entity to pay any punitive damages assessed against an employee
in certain instances" 4 and that the Medical Malpractice Act "allows for
punitive damages to be paid from the proceeds of the health care provider's insurance contract if the contract expressly provides coverage.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see SCRA 1986, 13-1827.
156. 106 N.M. at 396, 744 P.2d at 171.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. The court did note that General Accident could have contracted to exclude punitive
damages but that it did not do so with the language it used. Id.
161. Id. at 397, 744 P.2d at 172.
162. Id.
163. Id. The court cited a definition portion of the Insurance Code to support its conclusion of
what is allowed; N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-7-7 (Orig. Pamp. 1984) merely provides:
"Vehicle" insurance is insurance covering:
A. Physical Damages. Insurance against loss of or damage to any land
vehicle . . . resulting from or incident to ownership, maintenance or use of
any such vehicle ....
164. 106 N.M. at 397, 744 P.2d at 172; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
165. 106 N.M. at 397, 744 P.2d at 172 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-7(H) (Repl. Pamp.
1986)). That section actually provides that a "judgment of punitive damages against a health care
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Based on this cursory legislative review, the court concluded that insurance contracts covering punitive damages did not contravene positive law
of New Mexico nor any rule of public morals. "
Previous case law also indicated to the Baker court that insurance
contracts covering punitive damages were enforceable in New Mexico.
The court discussed Wolff v. General Casualty Co. of America"' where
the court had concluded that no public policy required the denial of
coverage for willful acts under a blanket liability policy.'68 In Wolff,
however, the court never reached the question of whether punitive damages were insurable. The Baker court then discussed the more recent case
of Stewart v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.'69 In Stewart, the
supreme court held an insurer liable for punitive damages under uninsured
motorist coverage but noted that the insurer
could ultimately seek recovery
70
from the tortfeasor who was uninsured.
The Baker court then turned to a general discussion of the public policy
reasons against allowing liability coverage for punitive damages. Those
policy reasons include: (1) potential reduction in the deterrent effect of
punitive damages; (2) the resulting rise in conflict of interest between the
insurer and the insured; and (3) the conflict between the rule allowing
jury consideration of the defendant's financial standing to determine punitive damages and the rule against referring to the defendant's insurance
in the presence of the jury. '' The court determined that the policy of
freedom to contract outweighed any dilution of deterrence or punishment,
that the conflict of interest between an insured and its insurer is greater
if punitive damages were not covered, and that the final objection could
be overcome by not allowing the jury to consider any available insurance
in assessing a defendant's financial standing. 7 2 The court, therefore,
reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of General Accident and
remanded for further action on the third party complaint. 73
'
In Suggs v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 74
' the tenth circuit
addressed the concept of insurable interest in the context of property
provider shall be the personal liability of the health care provider. Punitive damages shall not be
paid from the patient's compensation fund nor from the proceeds of the health care provider's
insurance contract unless the contract expressly provides coverage."
166. 106 N.M. at 397, 744 P.2d at 172.
167. Id. (citing 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961)).
168. 68 N.M. at 292, 361 P.2d at 330. The blanket liability policy did not have language excluding
coverage for the intentional act of assault and battery. The court refused to extend the public policy
prohibiting insurance coverage for intentionally produced injuries to unintended consequences of
intentional acts.
169. 104 N.M. 744, 726 P.2d 1374 (1986).
170. Id. at 747, 726 P.2d at 1377.
171. 106 N.M. at 397-98, 744 P.2d at 172-73.
172. Id. at 398, 744 P.2d at 173.
173. Id. at 399, 744 P.2d at 174.
174. 833 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1987).
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insurance. The plaintiffs had sued the defendant insurance company for
breach of contract for refusing to pay their claim after a fire destroyed
their mobile home and for engaging in bad faith in denying their claim. 75
'
The plaintiffs sought damages in the face amount of the contract, compensatory damages caused by the defendant's bad faith, punitive damages
and attorneys' fees.' 76 A jury awarded plaintiffs $26,530 for breach of the
insurance contract, $150,000 in compensatory damages on the bad faith
claim and no punitive damages.' 7 7 The district court awarded plaintiffs
$180,631 in attorneys' fees. ' The tenth circuit upheld the breach of
contract claim but remanded for a recalculation of damages.' 79 Furthermore, it concluded that the district court had erred in not granting a
judgment n.o.v. on the bad faith claim." 0 The tenth circuit, therefore,
reversed the award of $150,000 and upheld the award of no punitive
damages.' 8 ' Finally, the tenth circuit reversed the award of attorneys' fees
based on its conclusion
that State Farm's denial of the Suggs' claim was
82
not unreasonable.
The question of insurable interest was relevant to the plaintiff's breach
of contract claim. The plaintiffs had agreed orally to purchase the mobile
home from Jackie Suggs' sister.'8 3 In June 1982 the plaintiffs became the
co-obligors with the sister on a $13,500 note secured by the mobile home
with the understanding that the Suggs would refinance the home in early
1983 and pay the sister $10,000.84 The Suggs informed State Farm that
they were the new owners and substituted their name for the sister's as
the named insureds. 8 5 The fire occurred in September 1982.'86
State Farm argued that the Suggs lacked an insurable interest in the
mobile home because their oral purchase agreement would not be enforceable under the Uniform Commercial Code provisions governing the
transfer of mobile homes.' 8 7 The tenth circuit disagreed, relying on New
175. Id. at 885.
176. Id. at 886. The attorneys' fees claim was based on N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-2-1 (1978) which
provides that "where an insurer who has not paid a claim on any type of first party coverage, the
insured person may be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action upon a finding by
the court that the insurer acted unreasonably in failing to pay the claim."
177. 833 F.2d at 886.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 887.
182. In doing so, the court stated that the refusal to pay based on State Farm's claim that one of
the plaintiffs had burned or caused the burning of the mobile home "was not unreasonable, even if
it ultimately was not persuasive before the jury." 833 F.2d at 893, n. 17.
183. Id. at 887.
184. Id. at 884.
185. Id.at 885.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Mexico case law which held that "any person has an insurable interest
in property, by the existence of which he will gain an advantage, or by
the destruction of which he will suffer a loss, whether he has or has not
any title in, or lien upon, or possession of the property itself."' 88 The
court concluded that the Suggs had an insurable inteiest because they had
lived in the home for at least six weeks, were co-obligors on a note
secured by the mobile home and would presumably, upon completion of
all the payments due under the note or under the planned refinancing,
own the home.' 89 Consequently, the court determined that they would
indeed suffer a loss upon destruction of the home and thus had an insurable
interest in the property.
C. Multi-policy Issues
In CC Housing Corporationv. Ryder Truck Rental'" the supreme court
discussed the effect of having two insurance policies covering the same
property damage when both policies have "other insurance" clauses.
"Other insurance" clauses attempt to limit or eliminate the liability under
one policy because of the existence of another policy. The trial court had
ordered the two insurance companies to prorate the liability proportionate
to the total amount of coverage that each policy provided.' 9
While attached to a diesel tractor leased from Ryder Truck Rental, CC
Housing's flat-bed trailer was damaged in a traffic accident.' 92 A CC
Housing driver operated the rig pursuant to a contract with Specialized
Transport, Inc. 93
' Continental Casualty Company provided bodily injury
and property damage insurance to CC Housing.'9 4
The Continental Casualty Company policy had an "other insurance"
clause which provided that the Continental policy was an excess policy
with regard to the trailer because the trailer was connected to a vehicle
not owned by CC Housing. "'As excess coverage, the Continental policy
would cover only that amount of the loss which exceeded the maximum
188. Id. at 887 (citations omitted). The court could have relied on statutory law for its definition
of insurable interest. Subsequent to the cases cited by the court the New Mexico legislature passed
the New Mexico Insurance Code which defines insurable interest with respect to property law as
"any actual, lawful and substantial economic interest in the safety and preservation of the subject
of the insurance free from loss, destruction, pecuniary damage or impairment." N.M. STAT. ANN.
§59A-18-6 (Orig. Pamp. 1984).
189. 833 F.2d at 887-88.
190. 106 N.M. 577, 746 P.2d 1109 (1987).
191. Id.at 578, 746 P.2d at 1110.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.at 579, 746 P.2d at 1 11. The applicable provision of the Continental policy stated:
B. OTHER INSURANCE
1.For any covered auto you own this policy provides primary insurance.
For any covered auto you don't own, the insurance provided by this
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coverage of other valid and collectible insurance. 196 Continental, therefore, argued that it was not liable for any damage until the damage
exceeded the limits of liability of the Old Republic policy.'9 7
Old Republic Insurance Company insured the tractor owner, Ryder
Truck Rental, and the tractor operator, Specialized Transport, Inc. (SPX). 98
'
The Old Republic policy had an "other insurance" clause which was
really an escape clause because it denied all liability when the insured
had other valid and collectible insurance.'" Old Republic argued that
absent the two "other insurance" clauses, both companies would provide
primary coverage." Old Republic concluded that because no way existed
to carry out the intent of the two clauses and still provide coverage, the
trial court was correct in ordering the prorating of the liability.20
Old Republic urged the supreme court to adopt the Oregon LambWeston rule which provides that "whether one policy uses one clause or
another, when any come in conflict with the 'other insurance' clause of
another insurer, regardless of the nature of the clause, they are in fact
repugnant and each should be rejected in toto.'202 Those courts adopting
this rule invalidate the "other insurance" clause in each policy and prorate
the liability between the insurers. While the New Mexico Supreme Court
had never adopted the Oregon rule it had cited it with approval.2"3 The
CC Housing court, in an opinion by Justice Walters with Justices Sosa
policy is excess over any other collectible insurance. However, while a
covered auto which is a trailer is connected to another vehicle the liability
coverage this policy provides for the trailer:
a. Is excess while it is connected to a motor vehicle you don't own.
b. Is primary while it is connected to a covered auto you own.
2. When two or more policies cover on the same basis, either excess or
primary, we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that
the limit of our policy bears to the total of the limits of all the policies
covering on the same basis.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. The Old Republic policy provided:
It is agreed Endorsement #7, Receipt Basis-Driverless Cars, is amended in
part to read as follows:
3. The insurance coverage to such lessee/renter applies only to the maintenance or use of (I) the automobile so leased/rented and (2) trailers
owned by the lessee/renter or for which he is legally liable, but only
while attached to the leased/rented automobile, [sic] however, such insurance shall not apply if there is other coverage applicable to the trailer
and available to the lessee/renter. (Emphasis in original).
200. 106 N.M. at 579, 746 P.2d at I 11.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 580, 746 P.2d at 1112 (quoting Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Automobile Ins. Co.,
219 Or. 110, 129, 341 P.2d 110, 119 (1959)).
203. American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 85 N.M. 346, 512 P.2d 674
(1973).
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and Ransom concurring, seemed to refuse to adopt the Oregon rule to
the extent it would automatically apply to all cases having two "other
insurance" clauses at issue. The court did invoke the concept prorating
the liability in those instances where the enforcement of the clauses
together would deny coverage to the insured. - 4 In invoking that concept,
the court relied on a public policy against permitting an insurance company to write into its policy a clause which exculpates itself from liability
when it has received premiums. 2 5 The court affirmed the trial court's
decision which equally allocated the liability between the insurers because
the limits of each policy were the same. 2°
The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed how to construe "other
insurance" clauses in uninsured motorist policies in Branchal v. Safeco
Insurance Company of America in an opinion by Justice Walters with
Justices Stowers and Ransom concurring. 2 7 The issue in that case was
to whom should an injured passenger look as the primary insurer: to the
uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer of the vehicle in which he
was riding at the time of the injury or to his own insurer for uninsured
motorist coverage. 2 " The trial court ruled that the passenger should look
to his own company as the primary insurer .2 ' The supreme court reversed
and determined that the insurer of the vehicle in which the passenger was
riding should pay uninsured motorist benefits first, before the injured
party's own company is required to pay.2 '° In so holding, the court relied
on the concept that the policy closest to the risk should afford the primary
coverage. 2 ' ' The court determined that the policy covering the vehicle
involved in the accident is closer to the risk than the policy insuring the
non-owner driver or passenger.2 '2
The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of an
offset provision in an uninsured motorist policy in ContinentalInsurance
Company v. Fahey213 on a question certified to the court from the United
204. In invoking the prorating principle, the court specifically rejected a line of cases which holds
that a policy with an escape type of "other insurance" clause affords primary coverage and that a
policy with an excess type of "other insurance" clause provides secondary coverage. 106 N.M. at
580, 746 P.2d at II 11.
205. Id. at 581, 746 P.2d at 1112 (citing Branchal v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 106 N.M. 70, 738
P.2d 1315 (1987)); Sloan v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 86 N.M. 65, 519 P.2d 301 (1974).
206. 106N.M. at 581, 746 P.2d at 1112.
207. 106 N.M. 70, 738 P.2d 1315 (1987).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. In Sloan v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 86 N.M. 65, 519 P.2d 301 (1974), the court decided
that stacking of uninsured motorist policies carried by the driver, in whose auto Sloan was riding,
and by Sloan, himself, was allowed.
211. 106 N.M. at 70, 738 P.2d at 1315.
212. Id. at 71, 738 P.2d at 1316. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Austin Farm Center, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 503 (Minn. App. 1984).
213. 106 N.M. 603, 747 P.2d 249 (1987).
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States District Court. 2 4 Justice Walters wrote the court's opinion while

Justices Scarborough and Ransom concurred. 2 5 Continental provided
workers' compensation insurance and uninsured motorist coverage to the
City of Farmington. 2 6 A police officer, Fahey, while on duty, was struck
by an uninsured drunk driver and was injured. 21 7 Fahey sued for workers'
compensation benefits.2 8 The trial court had found Fahey totally disabled
for 110 weeks and awarded workers'compensation benefits of $27,690.30
plus $1,158.04 in medical expenses. 2 " Fahey also sought payment of the
policy limits under the uninsured motorist policy issued by Continental
to the City of Farmington.22 ° Continental filed a declaratory judgment
action in federal court and Fahey counterclaimed alleging damages caused
by the uninsured motorist's negligence. 22'
The uninsured motorist policy provided for a reduction in the policy
limits by the amount paid under any workers' compensation law.222 The
New Mexico Supreme Court decided, however, that Continental was not
entitled to offset any amounts paid under its separate workers' compensation policy. 223 The court reasoned that generally, uninsured motorist
policy provisions that limit the insured's recovery of damages are void
because they contravene the statutory requirement of a minimum coverage
under uninsured motorist provisions. 224 The court found that Continental's
offset provision would be a liability limitation not provided by the uninsured motorist statute and would contravene the intent of that statute.225
The court held the offset provision unenforceable.226
D. Insurer's Duties
The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the duties insurers owe to.
214. Id. at 604, 747 P.2d at 250. The question certified was:
Whether an insurance company which provides both workers' compensation
insurance and uninsured motorist coverage for a particular automobile accident
is entitled, under a written provision of the uninsured motorist policy, to offset
the amount recovered by the injured party under the workers' compensation
policy against any amount which may be payable under the uninsured motorist
policy?
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 605, 747 P.2d at 251.
225. Id. at 607, 747 P.2d at 253.
226. Id. The court refused to agree with Continental's argument that the offset clause was enforceable because its terms were sanctioned by the Superintendent of Insurance.
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their insureds in three cases. An insurer's duty to defend was discussed
in Insurance Company of North America v. Wylie227 and in Western Commerce Bank v. Reliance Insurance Co. 2- While the court did not break
new ground in those cases, the court did reiterate the distinction between
the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify. The general rule in New
Mexico continues to be that an insurer has a duty to defend its insured
if the allegations in the complaint show that an accident or occurrence
comes within the coverage of the policy, regardless of the ultimate liability
of the insured. 229 The duty to defend arises even though the complaint
fails to state facts with sufficient clarity to determine whether the action
comes within the coverage of the policy, if the alleged facts tend to show
an occurrence within coverage.23 °
The court addressed a question of first impression involving a title
insurer's duty to disclose a balloon payment contained in an underlying
real estate mortgage in Roscoe v. U.S. Life Title Insurance Co. of Dallas.2 3' The purchasers of an apartment complex sued U.S. Life Title.232
"
The purchasers had agreed to assume the existing mortgage.2 33
Neither
the assumption purchase agreement nor the real estate contract mentioned
a balloon payment which was included in the existing mortgage. 234 U.S.
Life Title prepared the closing documents. 235 The plaintiffs alleged that
U.S. Life Title was negligent in not informing them of the balloon payment. 236 The supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Sosa with Justices
Scarborough and Stowers concurring, affirmed the trial court's dismissal
and concluded that, as a matter of law, U.S. Life had no duty to disclose
or notify the plaintiffs of any balloon payment contained in the underlying
real estate mortgage.23 7

In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that the title company's duties to the plaintiffs were fixed by the contract of title insurance. 238 In the contract, U.S. Life had excluded from coverage any loss
or damage resulting from the underlying mortgage.2 39 Relying on Devlin
227. 105 N.M. 406, 733 P.2d 854 (1987).
228. 105 N.M. 346, 732 P.2d 873 (1987).
229. 105 N.M. at 409, 733 P.2d at 857.
230. Id.
231. 105 N.M. 589, 734 P.2d 1272 (1987).
232. Id. at 590, 734 P.2d at 1273.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 592, 734 P.2d at 1275.
238. Id. at 591, 734 P.2d at 1274. See also, Horn v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 89 N.M. 709,
557 P.2d 206 (1976).
239. 105 N.M. at 591, 734 P.2d at 1274.
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v. Bowden, 2" the court reasoned that a title company had no tort duty to
search records regarding an interest expressly excluded from coverage
under the policy.24 ' The court concluded that in the absence of a duty
owed by the title insurer, no negligence could be found as a matter of
law.242 The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the title
insurer. "I
Finally, the tenth circuit in Suggs v. State Farm Casualty Co. addressed
the duty of an insurer to act in good faith with respect to its insured. 2 "
In Suggs, the jury had awarded plaintiffs $150,000 in compensatory
damages after determining that State Farm had acted in bad faith towards
its insureds in refusing to pay their claim.245 Based on evidence gathered
during the investigations of State Farm's investigator and the State Fire
Marshal, State Farm had concluded that the fire which destroyed the
insureds' mobile home was intentionally set. 2" There was some evidence
that one of the insureds had the opportunity and motive to set the fire.247
The court noted that in Ambassador Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co.,248 the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that if
"the insurer, based on its honest judgment and acting on adequate information after competent investigation of the claim, does not settle and
instead proceeds to trial, then it has acted in good faith." 24 9 The court
concluded that under the circumstances of this case "while reasonable
minds could certainly differ on the question of whether State Farm's arson
defense was established, reasonable minds could not differ on the question
of whether, in this case, State Farm acted in bad faith. , 25 o The tenth

circuit, therefore, reversed the award of compensatory damages to the
plaintiffs on the bad faith claim.25 '

240. 97 N.M. 547, 641 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1982). In Devlin, the court affirmed a summary
judgment in favor of a title company on a claim brought by the seller of property for the alleged
failure of the title company to show a reserved mineral interest as a defect in title where the title
policy exempted mineral rights from coverage.
241. 105 N.M. at 591, 734 P.2d at 1274.
242. Id. The court determined that the existence of a duty is a question of law for the judge to
decide.
243. Id. at 592, 734 P.2d at 1275.
244. 833 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1987). For a description of the facts in the case see supra text
accompanying notes 174-189.
245. Id. at 886.
246. Id. at 885.
247. The court concluded that the fact that the criminal arson charges against Suggs were dropped
was immaterial. Id. at 891.
248. 102 N.M. 28, 690 P.2d 1022 (1984).
249. Id. at 32-33, 690 P.2d at 1026-27.
250. 833 F.2d at 891.
251. Id. at 894. For further discussion of the case see supra text accompanying notes 174-189.
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11. NEW LEGISLATION
During the 1987 legislative sessions the New Mexico legislature enacted insurance related statutes in five areas that may be of particular
interest to New Mexico attorneys and their clients. The legislation affected
the ability of an insurance company to terminate an agent, the procedure
an insurance company must follow before changing its rates, the rates
charged by companies for auto insurance, the offering of collision damage
waiver by car rental companies and the availability of medical insurance
for New Mexico citizens.
The 1987 legislature amended Section 59A-l 1-13 of the New Mexico
Insurance Code.252 That section was originally enacted in 1984253 and
amended in 1986254 to protect independent agents from having their appointments cancelled by insurance companies in certain instances. An
independent agent is one who is not an employee of an insurer and who
represents more than one insurer. 255 The original legislation provided that
an independent agent's appointment could not be terminated without 180
days' written notice unless the agent engaged in fraud or intentional
misrepresentation to the insurer or the insured.256 A terminated agent not
engaging in fraud or intentional misrepresentation was allowed to collect
commissions for renewals of policies for one year following termination.257 The apparent intent of the original legislation was to prevent
companies from using an independent agent to increase the number of
policy holders and then to cancel the agent's appointment but continue
to reap the benefits of policy holders renewing the policies.258
In 1986 and 1987, the legislature limited the applicability of Section
59A- 11-13 and increased the duty of the insurer upon termination of an
independent agent. In 19.86, the legislature amended the section so that
it only applied to property or casualty insurers.25 9 In 1987, the legislature
mandated that any notice of termination had to include the specific reason
for the termination.2 The legislature also added circumstances where
the 180 day notice was not required: where the termination was for
insolvency, abandonment, gross or willful misconduct, failure to pay over
to the company money due to the company under an existing agency or
STAT. ANN. §59A-I1-13 (Supp. 1987).
253. 1984 N.M. Laws, ch. 127, § 192.
254. 1986 N.M. Laws, ch. 109, § I.

252. N.M.
255. N.M.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

STAT. ANN.

§59A-I1-13 (Supp. 1987).

1984 N.M. Laws, ch. 127, § 192.
Id.
Id.
1986 N.M. Laws, ch. 109, § i.
1987 N.M. Laws, ch. 259, § 12 (codified at N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§59A-I1-13 (Supp. 1987)).
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company contract after receipt of a written demand or after an agent's
license had been revoked or terminated by the Superintendent of Insurance."' The 1987 legislature also severely limited the ability of an insurer
to cancel an agent because of an adverse loss-ratio experience.262 Finally,
the 1987 amendment excepted life, health, annuities and credit life and
health insurance from the definition of "policies". 26 3
A major change in the way the Department of Insurance regulates
insurance companies occurred as a result of legislation passed in 1987.
Prior to 1987, insurance companies were required to file their rates and
policy forms before they used them, but the companies did not have to
obtain prior approval of them.2 " The 1987 legislature changed the system
so that now companies must file their rates and forms at least sixty days
before their proposed effective date. 265 The Superintendent must review
the filing within sixty days. 2' He must approve the filing if it complies
with the Insurance Code and disapprove it only if it falls within specific
reasons for disapproval which are contained in the statute.267 The legislation includes an appropriation of almost $168,000 for the seventy-sixth
fiscal year to carry out the provisions of the Act. 26 s
Further, the 1987 legislature required insurance companies writing automobile insurance to provide an appropriate reduction in premium charges
for a three year period when the principal insured driver is fifty-five 2or
69
older and has successfully completed an accident prevention course.
The legislation does not set out what an appropriate reduction is but states
that any discount used by the insurer is presumed appropriate unless
credible data demonstrates otherwise. 2" The insurer may provide that the
discount will be lost if the insured is involved in an accident for which
the insured is at fault or if the insured is convicted or pleads guilty or
nolo contendre to a moving traffic violation.-271.
The 1987 legislature also addressed collision damage waivers. Collision
damage waivers (CDW's) are a current rage with car rental companies.
They generally allow a renter to pay a certain sum of money for the
privilege of not being personally responsible to pay immediately for any
loss or damage to the vehicle occurring while the renter uses the vehicle.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-11-13 (Supp. 1987).
264. 1984 N.M. Laws, ch. 127 §§342-44.
265. 1987 N.M. Laws, ch. 244, §2 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-17-9 (Supp. 1987)).
266. N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-17-13 (Supp. 1987).
267. Id.
268. 1987 N.M. Laws, ch. 244, § 12.
269. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-32-14 (Supp. 1987).
270. Id. Subsequent to the passage of the legislation, the Department of Insurance issued a bulletin
to all property and casualty insurers advising the insurers that a 10% or more discount would be
deemed appropriate.
271. N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-32-15 (Supp. 1987).
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While some question exists as to whether CDW's are a type of insurance,
the New Mexico legislature did not specifically address that question but
did include in the New Mexico Insurance Code certain requirements for
CDW's. 72 Rental car companies offering insurance coverage or CDW's

must state on the front page of the rental contract that the renter may be
covered for claims by his own personal vehicle insurance and that if that
coverage exists and is confirmed,273 the renter may require the rental car
company to submit any claims to the renter's personal insurance carrier.274
The rental car company is prohibited from making any "written or oral
representations that it will not present claims or negotiate with the renter's
insurance carrier. "275
The final piece of insurance-related legislation passed in 1987 was the
New Mexico Comprehensive Health Insurance Pool Act. 2 76 The purpose
of the Act is to provide access to health insurance coverage to New Mexico
residents who have been denied adequate health insurance and are considered uninsurable.277 The Act created the Pool consisting of health
insurance companies, nonprofit healthcare plans, health maintenance organizations and self insurers not subject to federal preemption. 278 The
Pool is currently issuing health insurance policies to those residents of
New Mexico who are eligible. Eligibility requirements include, among
other things, that the applicant has been rejected for similar health insurance coverage, has been offered coverage only at a rate exceeding the
Pool rate or has had coverage reduced. 279 The Pool's losses, if any, will
be assessed against the members of the Pool proportionate to their share
of the total health insurance premium collected for health insurance written in the state.280
CONCLUSION
The survey period was a busy time for the New Mexico judiciary and
legislature with respect to insurance law. As insurance continues to permeate the financial arrangements of individuals and organizations, the
problems brought to judges and legislators will often raise insurance
issues. Many of the decisions made by judges and legislators during the
survey period have the potential to alter significantly the various relationships inherent in the insurance arena.
272. N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-32-20 (Supp. 1987).
273. Confirmation of coverage includes telephone confirmation from an insurance company representative. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§59A-54-1 to -21 (Supp. 1987).
277. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-54-2 (Supp. 1987).

278. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-54-3(H) and -4 (Supp. 1987).
279. N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-54-12 (Supp. 1987).
280. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§59A-54-10 (Supp. 1987).

